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HE doctrine of unconscionabilityl has played a role in Anglo-Ameri-
can contract law since at least the eighteenth century. 2 In the past
twenty years, however, the doctrine has enjoyed an ascendancy that
could scarcely have been dreamed of by the chancellors in equity who first
employed the doctrine. 3 Its codification in section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code of almost all states,4 and its adoption and application by
courts in a wide variety of cases outside the scope of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code,5 have brought unconscionability into the forefront of modem
American contract law.
* B.A., J.D., Indiana University. Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana Univer-
sity School of Business.
1. "Unconscionability is the rubric under which the judiciary may refuse to enforce un-
fair or oppressive contracts in the absence of fraud or illegality." Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v.
John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982).
Although almost all courts and commentators agree that unconscionability is a concept inca-
pable of precise definition, some courts have offered working definitions. The Supreme Court
defined unconscionability as a bargain that "no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and.., no honest and fair man would accept on the other."
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28
Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)). One of the most frequently encountered formulations of un-
conscionability comes from the opinion in the landmark case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in which the court described unconscionability
as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Id. at 449.
2. See Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 937-38
(1969); Note, Commercial Decency and the Code-The Doctrine of Unconscionability Vindi-
cated, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1968).
3. Unconscionability originated in courts of equity primarily as a defense to specific per-
formance. Harrington, Unconscionability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 S. TEX.
L.J. 203, 204 (1968); Note, Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes New Duties on
Commercial Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 162-63 (1983) [hereinafter
Note, Unconscionability Redefined]; Note, supra note 2, at 1144. For a discussion of the use of
unconscionability to deny equitable relief see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.27 (1982).
Unconscionability was also available at law, but was rarely applied. Id. § 4.27, at 306; Spa-
nogle, supra note 2, at 938.
4. California did not adopt § 2-302 as part of its Uniform Commercial Code, but the
California legislature enacted an unconscionability statute that is applicable to all contracts,
not just those covered by the U.C.C. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985).
5. See Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 398 So. 2d 865, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (class action by condominium unit owners to avoid recreational lease); German-
town Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 341 Pa. Super. 42, 491 A.2d 138, 147-48 (1985) (unconscionabil-
ity applied to confession of judgment form and notes); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 (1979) (unconscionability provision closely paralleling § 2-302 of the
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The primary use of unconscionability has been to rescue from hard bar-
gains those who are grossly disadvantaged in their dealings with sharp, or at
least more sophisticated, traders.6 In equity, courts extended this solicitude
to particular classes of people who were deemed to be easily duped, such as
widows, orphans, farmers, sailors on leave, and the weakminded. 7 In mod-
ern cases, consumers, particularly low income consumers, have been the
most frequent beneficiaries of the doctrine of unconscionability. 8 Although
unconscionability is applied most often and most aggressively to protect con-
sumers, the doctrine is by no means applicable only to cons,,mers. Because
unconscionability operates as a general circumscription on contracts both
within and outside the UCC, 9 the mere fact that a contract is formed be-
tween two commercial parties does not insulate that contract from judicial
intervention on the ground of unconscionability.10 A number of those who
have successfully invoked unconscionability have been businesspeople, 1' or,
in the vernacular of the Code, merchants. 12
U.C.C.). For a discussion of the expansion of the concept of unconscionability beyond sales of
goods see Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 808-12 (1969).
6. Note, supra note 2, at 1144-45.
7. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 531-33 (1967). Professor Leff referred to these classes of persons as "presumptive
sillies." Id. at 532.
8. See, e.g., Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D. Pa.
1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982) (unconscionability rules developed in consumer cases
based on buyer's lack of sophistication, unfamiliarity with consequences of contract terms, and
need for goods or services; these considerations absent when neither party is a consumer); see
also Ellinghaus, supra note 5, at 762 n.21 (judicial trend toward regarding the contracts of low
income consumers as sui generis); id. at 768-73 (discussing use of unconscionability to prevent
exploitation of the underprivileged); Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionabil-
ity: A New Framework for U CC. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39 (1981) (consumers
may be modern class of "presumptive sillies"; warns against sweeping generalizations about
consumers),
9. One commentator referred to unconscionability as "an all-purpose weapon against
contract problems." Spanogle, supra note 2, at 931.
10. Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Il1. App. 3d 980, 408
N.E.2d 403, 409 (1980); see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 4.28, at 313-14. An early draft
of the section that later became § 2-302 specifically mentioned merchants, although it did so to
create more rigorous standards for merchants. For a discussion of the 1943 draft, which pro-
vided that merchants who signed unconscionable form contracts were bound by the contract
terms even if they had not read them, so long as they had had the opportunity to read them,
see Leff, supra note 7, at 492, 507 n.78. Nonmerchants, on the other hand, were not bound to
such contracts unless they had actually read them. This distinction between merchants and
nonmerchants was abandoned without explanation in the 1944 draft. Id. at 493, 507 n.78.
11. See, e.g., Langemeier v. National Oats Co., 775 F.2d 975, 976-77 (8th Cir. 1985) (pop-
corn grower); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971) (service
station operator); Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638,
640 (1981) (commercial weaving business). One commentator noted that the majority of the
cases cited as illustrations in the official comments to § 2-302 involve transactions between
merchants. Goldberg, Unconscionability in a Commercial Setting: The Assessment ofRisk in a
Contract to Build Nuclear Reactors, 58 WASH. L. REV. 343, 348 (1983).
12. The U.C.C. defines "merchant" as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or other-
wise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by
his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill." U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1977).
The term "merchant" in this Article indicates a person or entity engaged in any kind of
business, and is not limited to those who produce and sell goods. To borrow the Code's term,
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Opinions quite commonly assert a virtual presumption against uncon-
scionability in contracts between merchants 13 or rebuff a merchant's claim of
unconscionability with the most perfunctory of explanations. 14 Even in
opinions in which courts expend more energy explaining their unconsciona-
bility determinations, a great deal of variation exists in the courts' attention
to such factual matters as the parties' individual characteristics and bargain-
ing power' 5 as well as in the level of proof the courts require to sustain a
claim of unconscionability.16 At the other extreme, cases exist in which
courts demand "superconscionability"' 7 in various commercial settings.' 8
These cases make little sense if one views all contracts between merchants as
meriting the same unconscionability analysis. While it is clear that some
forms of unconscionability that occur in merchant-to-consumer transactions
probably could not occur in many merchant-to-merchant transactions, it is
equally clear that a principled application of the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity to merchant cases requires that courts take into account the characteris-
tics of the parties, the details of the transaction, and the type of
unconscionability alleged.
Although commentators have "lavished more ink" on unconscionability
than on any other single section of the Code,' 9 surprisingly little scholarly
attention has focused on the task of articulating standards for unconsciona-
bility determinations in contracts between merchants.20 This situation
any "professional in business," regardless of the nature of the business, is, for the purposes of
this Article, a merchant. See id. comment 2.
13. See, e.g., Phillips Mach. Co. v. LeBlond, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 318, 323 (N.D. Okla.
1980); All-States Leasing Co. v. Top Hat Lounge, Inc., 198 Mont. 1, 649 P.2d 1250, 1253
(1982).
14. See, e.g., M & W. Dev., Inc. v. El Paso Water Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 735, 634 P.2d 166,
170 (1981).
15. Compare BGW Assocs. v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 532 F. Supp. 1112, 1114
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (decision partially based on parties' individual characteristics) and Johnson v.
John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231, 238 (S.D. 1981) (same) with Communications Maintenance,
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1985) (no consideration of details of
parties' characteristics or bargaining process in explaining unconscionability determination)
and Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane & Equip. Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95, 104 (1984)
(same).
16. Compare Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa.
1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982) (proof of unequal bargaining power alone insufficient;
plaintiff failed to show unfair surprise) and Gordon v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 423 F.
Supp. 58, 62 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (plaintiff must show that defendant exerted unusually strong
bargaining power), aff'd, 564 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1977) with Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28
Cal. 3d 807, 824-25, 623 P.2d 165, 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 615 (1981) (en banc) (court should
closely scrutinize contract provisions that strongly indicate overreaching by dominant party).
17. Superconscionability means taking affirmative steps to communicate and explain a
contract or a provision of a contract. See Leff, supra note 7, at 493.
18. E.g., Langemeier v. National Oats Co., 775 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985); A & M
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124 (1982).
19. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 4.28, at 307. The commentary on unconscionability
is too vast to cite every article devoted to the topic. Some of the leading articles are El-
linghaus, supra note 5; Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 765 (1978); Hillman, supra note 8; Leff, supra note 7; Murray, Unconscionability.
Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); Spanogle, supra note 2.
20. Relatively few articles deal with unconscionability in a commercial context. For gen-
eral discussions of unconscionability in particular merchant-to-merchant cases or particular
contracting contexts in which both parties are merchants see Goldberg, supra note 11; Jordan,
1986] 1067
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
prompted one writer to comment that "[i]f unconscionability is still in its
formative stages, the doctrine is pre-embryonic with respect to merchant-to-
merchant transactions."' 2' The purpose of this Article is to suggest an ana-
lytical approach to unconscionability problems that arise in contracts be-
tween merchants. The first part of this Article reviews the purposes and
contours of the doctrine of unconscionability and describes forms of con-
tracting behavior that courts have held to be unconscionable in consumer
transactions. A summary of courts' treatment of unconscionability claims in
contracts between merchants follows. Finally, this Article proposes stan-
dards that courts can apply to increase the consistency and fairness of results
in future merchant-to-merchant cases.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. The Development of Unconscionability
The doctrine of unconscionability is part of the general family of contract
doctrines that is concerned with policing the reality of a party's consent and
the social desirability of the resulting bargain. Long before the concept of
unconscionability became widely used at law, courts created devices to curb
abuses in the bargaining process, such as fraud and misrepresentation, du-
ress, and undue influence. These abuses not only involved wrongful con-
duct, but they also negated the existence of the most fundamental element of
a contract: consent. Courts also exercised the power to withhold enforce-
ment of a contract when some public policy relating to the substance of the
parties' contract outweighed the public interest in freedom of contract. 22
Classical contract law defined courts' roles in policing contracts relatively
narrowly, however. Because of its emphasis on certainty and freedom to
contract, 23 classical contract law refrained from overt consideration of the
fairness of a contract unless one of the recognized abuses was present or
unless a court found that the enforcement of the contract would violate pub-
lic policy. 24 When the facts of a case failed to establish all of the elements of
one of these abuses, courts normally enforced the contract, reciting their
"optimistic creed"2 5 that the contract represented the will of people who
bargained with each other by choice and from positions of relative economic
Unconscionability at the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1978); Phillips, Unconscionability
and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 217-18, 224-26
(1986); Note, Unconscionability Redefined, supra note 3; Note, Unconscionable Business Con-
tracts.- A Doctrine Gone Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453 (1961) [hereinafter Note, Unconscionable
Business Contracts].
21. Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 779 (1982).
22. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 325-26.
23. At least one commentator disapproved of the view that "legal certainty and 'sound
principles' of contract law should not be sacrificed to dictates of justice or social desirability."
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 637 (1943).
24. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 742 (1982).




The rise of the standardized form contract exploded the presumptions of
equal bargaining power and free will in contracting. Widespread contracting
through standardized forms benefited enterprises and society as a whole by
reducing the costs of production and distribution.27 The form contract,
however, created the possibility for increasingly powerful enterprises to allo-
cate to the seller maximum advantage and minimum risk through the use of
contracts drafted in complex, legalistic language that often obfuscated the
contents of the documents.
28
Form contracts present opportunities for overreaching that make it unfair
to presume that a person's signature on a contract indicates consent. Such
contracts might give the appearance of mutual consent, but they totally lack
agreement in any realistic sense of the word. As a practical matter, few
people read form contracts.29 Even if a person wants to read a form con-
tract, he may not be afforded the time to read it. If he is permitted the time
to read it, he may not have the education or business experience to be able to
understand the language used in the contract or the likely legal effect of such
language. If he understands the language and effect of the contract, he may
not notice terms written in fine print or printed in unexpected places on the
document.30 Even if he reads and understands the contract perfectly, he
may not have any ability to negotiate for its terms and may enter the con-
tract because he has no alternative.
Under traditional contract doctrines, of course, a person was normally
bound by what he signed, and his failure to read did not vitiate his consent.
3 1
The duty to read eroded, however, as people were increasingly inundated
with the written word. 32 Moreover, the growing gulf of bargaining power
between the typical buyer and the typical seller and the prevalence of terms
standardized across entire industries created a situation in which classical
contract law's presumption of free will became untenable.
33
The initial legal response to the standardized forms phenomenon was an
attempt to avoid unfair results by using existing, technical devices such as
26. Id.
27. Id. at 631.
28. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 490, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114, 125 (1982) (length and obtuseness of most form contracts suggest that they are designed
to dissuade buyer from reading them).
29. For a discussion of the realities of form contracting and the resulting changes in the
duty to read see Murray, supra note 21, at 739.
30. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 4.26, at 294.
31. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932).
32. One commentator has suggested that relying on print as a means of communicating
and allocating risk is unconscionable. Ellinghaus, supra note 5, at 765.
33. Kessler, supra note 23, at 640.
Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is
even more important, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner with-
out using the appearance of authoritarian forms. Standard contracts in particu-
lar could thus become effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial
and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their
own making upon a vast host of vassals.
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interpreting ambiguous language against the drafter or striking a contract
for lack of mutuality or failure of consideration. 34 This approach not only
distorted contract precedents, it also exacerbated consent problems in form
contracts by encouraging draftsmen to try again with even more detailed
contract language. 35 In addition, the traditional policing doctrines of fraud,
duress, and undue influence proved to be insufficiently flexible to apply to
the types of overreaching made possible by form contracts. 36
The drafters of the sales article of the Code, critical of the way in which
courts had manipulated technical devices to avoid unfair results, 3 7 presented
the doctrine of unconscionability as a way of rectifying abuses of bargaining
power in form contracts and in other contracts for the sale of goods.38 The
UCC provision specifically granted courts the power to determine whether
contracts were unconscionable and to modify or withhold enforcement from
such contracts. 39 The courts took several years to begin using the doctrine
of unconscionability aggressively, 4° but the doctrine now has been litigated
in literally hundreds of cases. The common law of a number of states has
embraced,4 1 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has included, the
power to rewrite or strike contracts for unconscionability.42
B. The Meaning of Unconscionability
Neither the Code nor the Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains a
definition of the term "unconscionable. '43 The drafters chose instead to
provide the most general of guidance and to permit courts and commenta-
34. Spanogle, supra note 2, at 934-35; Note, supra note 2, at 1144.
35. Spanogle, supra note 2, at 934-35.
36. Fort, supra note 19, at 766-67. But see Hillman, supra note 8, at 17 (contending that
almost all unconscionability cases involving bargaining misconduct can and should be decided
under traditional legal doctrines).
37. See U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1977).
38. Fort, supra note 19, at 767; Note, Unconscionability Redefined, supra note 3, at 161-
63; Note, supra note 2, at 1145. The language of the 1943 draft of the Code's unconscionabil-
ity section was limited to unconscionableform contracts. This limitation was later abandoned,
and § 2-302 became at least potentially applicable to individually drafted contracts. Leff, supra
note 7, at 493. As a practical matter, the broadened scope of the section probably does not
make much difference, because almost all of the unconscionability cases concern form con-
tracts. Note, Unconscionability Redefined, supra note 3, at 163 n.17. One writer has estimated
that 99% of modern contracts are form contracts. Murray, supra note 21, at 739.
39. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). This section provides as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
40. See Harrington, supra note 3, at 205.
41. See sources cited supra note 5.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
43. The lack of clearly defined elements has been seen variously as a virtue and a vice.
Compare Note, Contracts-Developing Concepts of Unconscionability, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 87,
88-89 (1977) (virtue) with Leff, supra note 7, at 488-89 (vice).
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tors to flesh out the concept more fully. Equity cases that employed the
doctrine of unconscionability did not help to develop workable standards for
the application of the doctrine because the principle was poorly defined in
equity. 44
The comments to section 2-302 sketch at least a rough outline of the con-
cept of unconscionability.45 The comments indicate, for example, that un-
conscionability is not designed to disturb the allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power. 46  Thus, the mere existence of a disparity of
bargaining power between the parties is insufficient for a finding of uncon-
scionability.4 7 The comments further state that the determination of uncon-
scionability must take into account the general commercial background and
the needs of the particular trade at issue. 48 Clearly, unconscionability is to
be a fact-based determination; a clause that is unconscionable in one context
might be permissible in another. The comments to section 2-302 also state
that unconscionability exists when a contract is so one-sided 49 as to be un-
conscionable, 50 and that the principle behind unconscionability is to prevent
unfair surprise and oppression. 5 1
Unfair surprise and oppression describe the categories of contracting defi-
ciencies that attract a finding of unconscionability. Both of these terms im-
ply flawed consent. "Unfair surprise" indicates that some unexpected term
has been sprung on a party unfairly, 52 a state of affairs that negates the exist-
ence of knowing consent.5 3 Unfair surprise is akin to deception in that it
implies a situation in which a drafting party has concealed hard terms in fine
print, under misleading headings, or in unexpected places in the contract. 54
In some cases, a drafting party may have to take affirmative steps to disclose
hard terms to a buyer in order to avoid unfair surprise.55
44. See Spanogle, supra note 2, at 937-38.
45. Professors White and Summers condemn the test for unconscionability stated in the
comments to § 2-302 as useless. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3, at 151 (2d ed. 1980).
46. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1977).
47. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment d (1979) ("A bar-
gain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position,
nor even because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party.").
48. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1977).
49. One-sidedness generally means overall imbalance in the parties' rights and duties.
This imbalance suggests that the "whole pie" drafting style is an invitation to a finding of
unconscionability. For a discussion of overall imbalance cases see Ellinghaus, supra note 5, at
777-86.
50. For a discussion of the point in the drafting history of § 2-302 in which unconsciona-
bility came to be "defined in terms of itself" see Leff, supra note 7, at 498-99.
51. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1977).
52. One commentator refers to this type of unconscionability as a problem of unexpected
terms. Murray, supra note 21, at 776.
53. Id.; see also Spanogle, supra note 2, at 943 (unfair surprise implies a form of
deception).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394, 400-01 (1980).
55. Courts impose this duty to disclose when some demonstrated impairment in the
buyer's ability to read and understand the contract exists. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil
Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971) (complaining party who had little education
1986] 1071
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The word "oppression" 56 indicates either a situation in which a contract
term works great hardship on a party or one in which a stronger party is able
to oppress a weaker one by imposing unfavorable terms on him. The grava-
men of oppression is not that the weaker party did not know what he was
signing, but that he had no realistic choice about the terms. 57 Oppression
implies the absence of voluntary consent. Courts may find oppression when
one party has exploited the other party's necessitous circumstances to drive
too hard a bargain. 58 Oppression may exist in the classic contract of adhe-
sion, in which one party dictates the terms of a contract on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. 59 Courts might also find oppression in high pressure tactics or
in a bargaining situation fraught with haste or pressure.6 °
One court described unconscionability as a "genus, of which there is more
than one species."' 6' Most judges and commentators agree that an uncon-
scionability determination involves the evaluation of two distinct but interre-
lated matters: how the parties arrived at the terms, and the justifiability of
the terms themselves. The first aspect of unconscionability has to do with
the issue of voluntary and knowing assent.62 This aspect, termed the proce-
dural aspect of unconscionability, focuses on facts that relate to the bargain-
ing, or nonbargaining, process. 63 Given its concern for reality of consent,
the procedural aspect of unconscionability overlaps with the traditional con-
tract doctrines regarding formation of a contract and those that police agree-
ments for fraud, duress, and the like. 64
The second aspect of unconscionability concerns the fairness of the terms
themselves. This aspect, which is often referred to as substantive uncon-
scionability,6 bears some similarity to the exercise of courts' traditional
presented with complex contract). For a discussion of the duty to disclose see Hillman, supra
note 8, at 10-15.
56. One commentator has criticized the word "oppression" as being "perfectly ambigu-
ous" because it can refer to either the effect of a contract or the process by which the contract
was formed. Leff, supra note 7, at 499.
57. See Murray, supra note 21, at 777-78. The author suggests that the essence of this
type of unconscionability is lack of choice. Id. at 777.
58. See the facts presented in In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa.
1966) (bankrupt had obligation to borrow from only one source, but that souce retained power
to refuse to lend). See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 754-63. The author terms this kind of case
a "distress" case and suggests that society's moral order may support the position that the
treatment of a necessitous person as simply an economic object is wrong. Id. at 756. Taking
advantage of financial distress to drive a hard bargain would not be duress under prevailing
principles of economic duress, unless the financial distress were caused by one's own wrongful
act. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983).
59. E.g. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 925, 702 P.2d 503, 511, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 353 (1985); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 87
(1960).
60. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 341 Pa. Super. 42, 491 A.2d 138, 144 (1985).
61. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
62. Murray, supra note 21, at 776-77.
63. Leff, supra note 7, at 489-508, 533-37.
64. See Ellinghaus, supra note 5, at 763-64; Hillman, supra note 8, at 7.
65. Leff, supra note 7, at 509-28, 537-41. The author's identification of the two dimen-
sions of unconscionability has been cited by almost all subsequent writers in the field, as well as
by some courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich.
1976); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486-88, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
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power to withhold enforcement from contracts that violate public policy.66
Delimiting the concept of substantive unconscionability is difficult because
almost any term in a contract is at least potentially harsh. 67 Courts have
found substantive unconscionability most frequently in various types of risk
shifting or "remedy meddling" provisions that are commercially unreasona-
ble under a given set of facts.68 In some cases, courts have found excessive
prices to be substantive unconscionability. 69
Procedural and substantive unconscionability usually go hand in hand.
The concept of unfair surprise implies the coexistence of procedural and sub-
stantive unfairness. 70 A contract might present a term in fine print, for ex-
ample, and not be unfairly surprising. 71 If the parties expected the term in
that type of contract, the term would not be surprising, and, if the term were
necessary to protect the drafting party's legitimate interests, it would not be
unfair. Oppression also connotes substantive as well as procedural unfair-
ness. Disparity of bargaining power becomes oppressive only when one of
the parties obtains an unfair term through its bargaining advantage.
In almost all cases in which courts have found unconscionability, elements
of both procedural and substantive unfairness have existed. 72 Courts require
no set ratio of procedural to substantive unconscionability; they usually use
a loose sliding scale. 73 A court might find unconscionable a contract with a
fairly mild defect in the bargaining process if the terms agreed upon were
extremely unreasonable. Similarly, a court can find unconscionable a con-
tract procured through grossly unfair means or presenting a serious defi-
ciency in voluntary consent even though the substantive advantage given to
the other party is fairly mild. Rare cases exist, however, in which a court
labels a contract unconscionable even when no defect in knowing or volun-
tary consent has occurred. 74
121-23 (1982); Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980,
408 N.E.2d 403, 409-11 (1980).
66. See Fort, supra note 19, at 771-78.
67. Leff, supra note 7, at 540.
68. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 4-6.
69. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886, 889
(1964); Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78, 80 (Dist. Ct. 1970); Frostifresh
Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967). One commentator maintains that
all unconscionability is essentially a matter of price. Absent illegality, some price exists at
which no term would be unconscionable. Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts, supra note
20, at 456.
70. Spanogle, supra note 2, at 944.
71. See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,
1042 (Utah 1985); see also Spanogle, supra note 2, at 943-44 (example of fine print clause in
security agreement that provided for creditor's right to repossess goods).
72. Spanogle, supra note 2, at 932.
73. Note, supra note 43, at 104, 111.
74. E.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Top Hat Lounge, 649 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Mont. 1982)
(contract provisions waiving right to jury trial and right to counterclaim unconscionable as a
matter of law); see Spanogle, supra note 2, at 948. Courts often consider the excessive price
cases to be pure substantive unconscionability cases. See supra note 69.
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II. UNCONSCIONABILITY BETWEEN MERCHANTS: THE CASE LAW
The cases involving unconscionability between merchants involve chal-
lenges to all types of contract clauses, ranging from risk allocation and rem-
edy meddling provisions to arbitration clauses and termination of
distributorship provisions. Few of the provisions challenged in these cases
have been so overbearing that they have been termed unconscionable per
se. 75 As is true in the cases dealing with unconscionability in consumer
transactions, the major determination for a court to make is whether the
provision was unconscionable in the particular setting involved.
The outcome of a merchant-to-merchant unconscionability case depends
greatly on two factors: the complaining party's ability to represent his inter-
ests in the transaction, or bargaining capability, 76 and the amount of choice
that he had regarding the terms of the contract and the party with whom he
dealt. It is helpful to view the merchant cases along a continuum ranging
from the cases in which both parties had high bargaining capability and op-
portunity to choose, to those in which the complaining party was demon-
strably disadvantaged in its bargaining capability and had little or no
opportunity to choose. The possibility of a finding of unconscionability di-
minishes as the complaining party's bargaining capability and the amount of
real bargaining increase. In the middle of the continuum are cases in which
people with high bargaining capability enter contracts that are essentially
nonnegotiable. The decisions in this group are less predictable. At the other
extreme of the continuum, in cases in which the complaining parties are
deficient in their bargaining capability and have little opportunity to choose,
findings of unconscionability are much more feasible. 77
A. Capable Parties with Opportunity to Choose
Those most likely to lose an unconscionability argument are those who
actively bargained for a contract or who had the opportunity to bargain and
were not disadvantaged in any significant way in the bargaining process. In
Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co. ,78 for example, a contract between Bowlin's,
a company operating ten retail outlets, and its gasoline supplier provided
that Bowlin's waived any claim of a shortage in delivery not made within a
75. But see Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1976) (ten-day
cancellation agreement available only to Ashland unconscionable on its face); Trinkle v. Schu-
macher Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Ct. App. 1980) (contract term that pro-
vides neither a minimum nor an adequate remedy unconscionable).
76. The term "bargaining capability" means personal characteristics of the complaining
party that enable it to represent its interests effectively. For example, education, business expe-
rience, understanding of legal matters, reading ability, and representation by counsel would be
relevant to a determination of a party's bargaining capability. Bargaining capability relates to
the person's ability to understand the terms offered by the other party and to articulate his own
position and needs. Bargaining power, on the other hand, refers to a party's ability to effectu-
ate changes in the terms that are offered.
77. Neat classifications are not always possible, however, because courts do not consis-
tently provide relevant information about the parties or the bargaining process.




two-day period after that delivery. Bowlin's auditing department discovered
that shortages in deliveries to one of its stations over a fifteen-month-period
amounted to some $70,000 worth of gasoline.
When Bowlin's sued to collect the money it had overpaid, the trial court
held that the two-day notice provision was unconscionable. 79 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the contract was one be-
tween two "experienced and sophisticated business concerns."8 0 The court
emphasized that Bowlin's sold gasoline products supplied by a number of
other companies, and that Bowlin's had not shown that it had been unable to
find another supplier with whom it could have negotiated other terms.8 I
The fact that the executive vice president of Bowlin's was fully aware of the
two-day provision, and that he understood what the provision meant further
persuaded the court.8 2 In fact, Bowlin's management had established spe-
cific procedures for verifying deliveries so that it could report shortages
within two days.8 3 Bowlin's argued that the two-day notice provision was
one-sided because it shifted the entire risk to the buyer if a claim of shortage
were not made in two days, but the court rejected this argument because the
short notice term served a commercially reasonable purpose.8 4 Despite the
fact that the two-day notice provision worked a significant hardship on the
buyer, the facts failed to suggest any form of deficiency in the contracting
process or in the contract itself.
It would be tempting to conclude that Bowlin's and other companies of
equal or greater size lose their unconscionability claims because they are big
companies. Certainly, corporate giants dealing with other corporate giants
should assume that a deal, no matter how unfortunate its outcome, will not
be held unconscionable.8 5 This result, however, occurs primarily because
the way large business concerns form contracts does not lend itself to a find-
ing of unconscionability; the size of the company has little to do with the
determination.
Skilled negotiators who have considerable business experience and de-
tailed knowledge of the subject matter of the transaction are likely to have
negotiated a contract between two large businesses. A large company will
have ready access to counsel, which it will not hesitate to use. Thus, the
bargaining capability of a big business is likely to be high. A large company
is also likely to have maximum choice. The company would be likely to
hammer out its deals through extensive actual bargaining in which each
party has the time and opportunity to present its position. Such a party's
ability to abort negotiations and to shop around for its needs is likely to
79. Id. at 662, 662 P.2d at 665.
80. Id. at 668, 662 P.2d at 669 (quoting the trial court's findings).
81. Id. at 666-67, 662 P.2d at 667-68.
82. Id. at 668, 662 P.2d at 669.
83. Id. at 669, 662 P.2d at 670.
84. Id. at 668, 662 P.2d at 668-69.
85. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utils., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 329-30 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 572, 579 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 572 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Royal Indem. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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deter bargaining abuses. Thus, the size of the complaining party's business
is predictive of the outcome of an unconscionability claim, but only because
large size implies high bargaining capability and choice.
High capability and choice can also occur in cases in which the com-
plaining party is a smaller company, even when a significant disparity of size
exists between the two parties to the contract. When the party claiming
unconscionability is characterized as being sophisticated, knowledgeable, or
experienced in commercial matters and that party actually had the opportu-
nity to codetermine terms, courts are unlikely to find that the contract that
party entered was unconscionable.8 6 The essence of these cases is that the
complaining party had both the ability to represent its interests effectively in
the bargaining process87 and a choice about terms or parties with whom to
deal.88 Another way of expressing this idea is that the facts presented in the
high capability and choice cases virtually negate the existence of the forms of
unconscionability that occur in other settings.
In some cases, however, courts' characterization of the parties as capable
people who had the opportunity to choose is questionable. In Smith v.
Price's Creameries, Inc.,89 for example, the Smiths, a married couple, con-
tracted to act as a wholesale distributor of the defendant's products. They
paid $72,000 to the prior distributor and borrowed $26,000 for working cap-
ital. The contract between the Smiths and Price's provided for termination
at will by either party upon thirty days' notice. It also contained an ancil-
lary covenant not to compete that restricted the Smiths' right to compete for
a period of two years. According to the Smiths, Price's representative told
them that the distributorship would continue.
Six months after the Smiths took over the business, Price's gave notice to
86. See Bernina Distribs., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Machs. Co., 646 F.2d 434, 440 (10th
Cir. 1981); Gelderman & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1975);
BGW Assocs. v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 532 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Phillips
Mach. Co. v. LeBlond, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 318, 324 (N.D. Okla. 1980); Amerifirst Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Cohen, 454 So. 2d 626, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Neal v. Lacob, 31 111.
App. 3d 137, 334 N.E.2d 435, 440 (1975); Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89
Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654, 657 (1973); K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263
A.2d 390, 393 (1970); Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d
1028, 1048 (Utah 1985).
87. Several courts have pointed out that counsel or other experienced negotiators repre-
sented the complaining party throughout the contract negotiation process. Kerr-McGee Corp.
v. Northern Utils., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 330 (10th Cir. 1982); Bernina Distribs., Inc. v. Bernina
Sewing Machs. Co., 646 F.2d 434, 440 (10th Cir. 1981); Computerized Radiological Servs. v.
Syntax Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In a few cases lawyers have wholly
or partially owned the complaining parties. BGW Assocs., Inc. v. Valley Broadcasting Co.,
532 F. Supp. 1112, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa.
303, 263 A.2d 390, 393 (1970).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Bedford Assocs., 657 F.2d 1300, 1313 (2d Cir. 1981) (com-
plaining party sophisticated in business matters and able to negotiate other changes in con-
tract), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 914 (1982); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 420 (5th
Cir. 1980) (contract product of extensive negotiation, no gross disproportion of bargaining
power, and no lack of competition among sellers on warranties); Hydraform Prods. Corp. v.
American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 344 (N.H. 1985) (complaining party had
access to competitors and had dealt with them before).
89. 98 N.M. 541, 650 P.2d 825 (1982).
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terminate. The Smiths brought suit against Price's, alleging that the termi-
nation was wrongful. They asserted that the termination provision was un-
conscionable. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected their argument on
the grounds that the provision was clearly worded and the Smiths were
aware of the provision, but did not attempt to renegotiate it.90 The court
stated that Mr. Smith's background and experience had given him a working
knowledge of the subject matter of the contract. 91 The court emphasized the
fact that the Smiths were neither rushed into signing the contract nor de-
prived of the opportunity to examine it or have an attorney examine it.92
The court stated that even if the Smiths had believed Price's representation
that their distributorship would continue, such a representation would not
be fraud or misrepresentation because of the clear wording of the contract.
93
The court concluded that each party is presumed to know what he signs, and
that it is not the province of a court to alter or amend contracts that parties
freely enter.94
This case has several troubling aspects. First, the court's characterization
of the Smiths as parties who were capable of representing their interests in
this transaction seems dubious. Mr. Smith's education and background indi-
cate that he was intellectually capable of reading and understanding con-
tracts, but whether he had the background and experience to understand
what the termination clause meant in terms of the future of his considerable
investment is unclear. Second, treating the Smiths' failure to attempt to ne-
gotiate as the equivalent of choice seems incorrect. The Smiths' failure to try
to negotiate does not mean that the contract was negotiable. The Smiths'
failure to get legal counsel and to negotiate seems more likely to indicate that
the Smiths were unsophisticated businesspeople who were over-awed by the
printed contract or knew they could not change it, rather than that they
exercised some form of choice.
B. Capable Parties with Little Opportunity to Choose
The fact that a party is capable of representing his interests effectively
bears on the issue of knowing consent. A commercial party with a decent
education, sophisticated business knowledge, and extensive contracting ex-
perience is capable of reading a contract, understanding or inquiring into the
meaning of the words used, and appreciating the legal effect of the contract.
Thus, the fact that a party is highly capable should probably preclude the
unfair surprise species of unconscionability. The fact that a party is highly
capable does not, however, mean that he has choice. A party may be per-
fectly able to read and understand a contract without having an opportunity
to codetermine terms. Thus, although the fact that the parties are highly
90. Id. at 544, 650 P.2d at 828.
91. Id. Mr. Smith was a 28-year-old college educated man who had previous work experi-
ence as an employee of a finance company, as an insurance salesman, and as a police officer.
The opinion provides no details about Mrs. Smith.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 545, 650 P.2d at 829.
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capable would tend to negate the unfair surprise species of unconscionabil-
ity,95 the possibility for the oppression species of unconscionability should
still exist. The case law indicates, however, a great deal of variation in the
form of unconscionability that courts are willing to consider in this group of
cases.
In one line of cases the courts appear to treat clearly stated and under-
stood terms as being dispositive on the issue of unconscionability. In
Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc.,96 another franchise termination case, the plain-
tiff was a high school graduate who had one year of college and who had
been recently discharged from a managerial job. When Dairy Mart
presented the contract to him, its representative read the contract to him and
advised him to take it to an attorney, but also informed him that the contract
was nonnegotiable. When Dairy Mart gave notice to terminate the plain-
tiff's franchise pursuant to the contract, Zapatha brought suit, claiming that
the termination provision was unconscionable.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld the contract primarily on
the ground that no unfair surprise existed. 97 The court emphasized that the
contract was not in fine print, that the representative pointed out the termi-
nation clause to Zapatha, and that Zapatha had the opportunity to have the
contract reviewed by an attorney.98 The court stated its belief that a person
with Zapatha's business experience should not have been unfairly sur-
prised.99 The court further concluded that the contract was not oppressive
because Dairy Mart was obligated to repurchase Zapatha's equipment and
inventory upon termination.'1o The plaintiff had not shown, according to
the court, that the termination clause was not reasonably related to Dairy
Mart's needs. 101
The holding in Zapatha and other cases that follow a similar approach 10 2
95. But see C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). In
this case the court held that the owner of a fertilizer plant was unfairly surprised by an uncon-
scionable insurance policy. The court did not recite any facts regarding the insured's sophisti-
cation in insurance matters, so whether this is a capable party case or an unsophisticated party
case is unclear. Insurance contracts might be unique in this regard, because few people read
and understand insurance policies.
96. 381 Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (1980).
97. Id. at 293, 408 N.E.2d at 1376-77.
98. Id. at 294, 408 N.E.2d at 1377.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 295, 408 N.E.2d at 1377. This court apparently interpreted oppressive to refer
to harsh results rather than to nonbargaining.
101. Id. The court's allocation of the burden of proof seems curious. Although the court
in Zapatha did not find any procedural unconscionability, the burden of proving commercial
reasonableness of terms should be allocated to the party who seeks to enforce the term in a
case in which procedural unconscionability existed. This party has the best information about
his own commercial needs. See also Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d
571, 576 (8th Cir. 1975) (party seeking to uphold term must show provision bears some rea-
sonable relationship to risks and needs of business).
102. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Central Soya of Athens, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518,
527 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 779
(N.D. Ga. 1983); RJM Sales & Mktg., Inc. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (D.
Minn. 1982); Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231, 236-38 (S.D. 1981).
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disregards the possibility that an experienced party presented with a non-
negotiable contract can be victimized by lack of choice. These cases appear
to take the position that lack of choice short of economic duress should not
be a ground for a finding of unconscionability. 10 3 This approach permits a
party to insulate its contract from judicial interference by drafting it in ex-
tremely clear language and presenting it in a superconscionable manner.104
Not all of the cases in the high capability, low choice category ignore or
reject the possibility of oppression-type unconscionability, however. In Pitts-
field Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc. 105 the plaintiff, who was in the
weaving business, bought yarn from the defendant. The contract contained
an arbitration clause and provided for a limited number of days in which the
plaintiff could make a claim for obvious or latent defects. The yarn proved
to be defective, and the plaintiff filed suit for breach of warranty. The de-
fendant moved to dismiss pursuant to the arbitration clause.
In finding the contract to be unconscionable, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the arbitration clause was both
standard in the industry and nonnegotiable.l 0 6 Goods would not be shipped
without the contract. Pittsfield Weaving, in fact, had tried to negotiate
against the arbitration clause with other sellers, but had had no success. 107
Nothing in the opinion suggests any procedural unconscionability of the un-
fair surprise variety.
This case clearly demonstrates that under some facts courts will find a
contract unconscionable because of oppression or lack of choice, even when
a knowledgeable party understood the terms at the time of contracting.10 8
Significantly, the notice of defect clause in the Pittsfield Weaving contract
worked an extreme hardship on the buyer and may have shifted more risk to
the buyer than was needed to protect the seller's interests.' 0 9 This fact indi-
cates that among merchants in the high capability, little choice category, a
significant substantive advantage that the drafting party arrogates can tip the
balance toward unconscionability." 0
A few cases exist in which courts have found contracts between two com-
mercial parties to be unconscionable without any discussion of the existence
103. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982); Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231, 236-38 (S.D.
1981).
104. For a discussion of drafting techniques that avoid procedural unconscionability see
Note, Unconscionability Redefined, supra note 3, at 184-88.
105. 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638 (1981).
106. Id. at 348, 430 A.2d at 640.
107. Id.
108. Accord Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 824, 623 P.2d 165, 176, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 604, 615 (1981) (en banc); Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 171
N.W.2d 689, 692 (1969).
109. The buyer would not discover some latent defects until after processing, in which case
the buyer would have waived its rights to damages under the short notice clause. Pittsfield
Weaving, 121 N.H. at 347, 430 A.2d at 640.




of procedural unconscionability."II In Trinkle v. Schumacher Co. 112 the
plaintiff, who was in the drapery business, ordered fabric from the defend-
ant. The invoice delivered to the buyer stated conspicuously that the seller
would allow no claims after the buyer cut the goods. After the fabric was
cut the buyer discovered a defect that he could not have discovered before
the fabric was processed. The buyer brought suit for breach of warranty.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that the contract was uncon-
scionable despite the fact that both parties were commercially experienced
and had previously engaged in occasional business dealings with each
other.1 3 The court acknowledged that unconscionability rarely exists in
commercial settings that involve equal bargaining power.' 1 4 In this in-
stance, however, the fact that the clause deprived the buyer of all remedies,
even though the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose clearly had been
breached, convinced the court that unconscionability existed. 115 The clause
operated to shift the risk of latent defects to the buyer; such a shift appar-
ently was too much to impose on even a sophisticated buyer in the absence
of real bargaining and agreement.
C Unsophisticated Parties with Little Opportunity to Choose
At the extreme of the continuum of merchant cases are those cases involv-
ing relatively unsophisticated businesspersons dealing in a context in which
they have little or no ability to select among suppliers or little or no ability to
codetermine terms of an agreement. Thinking of such businesses as
"merchants in name only"' " 6 is tempting, but while they are guppies in the
ocean of commerce, those businesspersons are not necessarily inexperienced.
They may be extremely experienced in their fields, but totally lacking in ex-
perience and sophistication in the matters involved in a particular transac-
tion,117 or they may be operating under some real handicap such as
illiteracy118 or lack of education. "19
Most of the cases in this group involve the unfair surprise form of uncon-
111. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 195 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433, 438-40 (1976);
Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255, 258-59 (Ct. App. 1980). Some
liberties have been taken in the classification of these cases as high capability or low choice
cases, since the courts did not ground their opinions on either basis. The cases have been
labeled as high capability cases because the cases did not indicate that the complaining parties
were particularly deficient in their bargaining capabilities. The low choice label was applied
because the facts of the cases indicated that the contract terms were likely imposed rather than
negotiated.
112. 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980).
113. Id. at 18-19, 301 N.W.2d at 256.
114. Id. at 19, 301 N.W.2d at 259.
115. Id.
116. Murray, supra note 21, at 778; see Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 341 Pa.
Super. 42, 491 A.2d 138, 146 n.5 (1985). "Modern courts recognize that the signer may be
theoretically and technically a merchant but functionally a consumer in terms of education,
business acumen, and experience." Id.
117. See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489-90, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 124 (1982).
118. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
119. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1971).
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scionability. This unconscionability sometimes is found in confusing con-
tract language or format.' 20 In other cases the bargaining process is flawed
by more overt instances of procedural unfairness. The case of Industralease
Automated & Scientific Equipment Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 2 1 for
example, presented procedural flaws that had the flavor of fraud, duress, and
undue influence, but fell short of all of those doctrines.
In Industralease the defendant R.M.E. was a small corporation, wholly
owned by Max and Irene Gross, that owned and operated a picnic ground.
R.M.E. contracted to lease equipment from the plaintiff for nonpollutant
burning. Initially, Gross signed a lease agreement that contained an express
warranty. After he had spent money installing improvements on his prop-
erty that were needed for the use of the leased equipment, the plaintiff
presented him with a second contract, saying that the lease he had signed
before was no good and that new papers had to be signed so that the deal
could go forward. The plaintiff also told Gross that the new papers were like
the other papers he had signed, except that a different company's name ap-
peared at the top. 12 2 Gross signed the second lease, apparently without
reading it. The second lease was substantially different from the first, con-
taining, among other different terms, an unqualified disclaimer of warranties.
The equipment proved to be defective, and R.M.E. stopped making rental
payments. The plaintiff sued R.M.E. for the balance of rent payments due
under the lease, almost $18,000, and R.M.E. defended on the ground that
the plaintiff had breached its warranty.
According to the court, the case contained elements of both procedural
and substantive unconscionability. 123 The court found that the disclaimer
should not be enforced because the contracting process was tainted by a per-
vasive atmosphere of haste and pressure. 124 R.M.E., which had depended
heavily on the plaintiff to design and build equipment for it, was not in-
formed until the beginning of its business season that it had to execute a new
contract to ensure delivery of the needed product. 125 The substantive unfair-
ness consisted of the one-sidedness that would have resulted if R.M.E. had
to pay all the lease payments for equipment that did not work at all. 12 6
Several other cases have presented a combination of unfair surprise and
120. See, e.g., Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980,
408 N.E.2d 403, 411 (1980); Jutta's Inc. v. Fireco Equip. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 301, 375 A.2d
687, 690-91 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); cf Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Hudgens, 455 So. 2d 651,
654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (fine print, term on reverse side, defendant an uncounseled
layman; case remanded for hearing to determine commercial setting, purpose, and effect). The
classification of the Frank's and Jutta's cases is somewhat arbitrary, because the courts pro-
vided no details about the parties. The fact pattern indicated that the parties were uncounseled
and inexperienced in the transactions in question.
121. 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977).
122. Id. at 484, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
123. Id. at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
124. Id., 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
125. Id. at 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
126. Id. The court admitted considering facts occurring after the contract formation in
making this determination. Id.
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oppression. In Hanson v. Funk Seeds International127 a farmer was permit-
ted to escape limited warranty and limitation of remedy clauses, which were
printed on a delivery receipt and on bags of seed the farmer had
purchased.' 28 Emphasizing the one-sidedness of leaving the buyer without a
remedy, the court noted that the plaintiff, like most farmers, was not in a
position to bargain for favorable contract terms, nor to test the seed.' 29
Unconscionable oppression, as in a contract of adhesion, was present in
Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,130 one of the host of cases in
which parties have challenged exculpatory clauses and limitation of remedy
clauses contained in Yellow Pages advertising contracts.' 3 ' Rozeboom, the
sole proprietor of an electrical contracting business that he operated out of
his home, contracted for an advertisement in the Yellow Pages. The con-
tract provided that the telephone company's liability for any errors in listing
or omitting advertisements could be limited to the cost of the advertisement.
Rozeboom's ad was omitted from the directory, and he sued for $25,000 of
business losses that allegedly resulted from this omission. The court found
the contract unconscionable because Rozeboom, an individual dealing with a
monopoly, had no ability to bargain for terms.132 The deficiency in the con-
tract was not that it was a product of unequal bargaining power, but that the
defendant had used its monopoly status to impose a contract that left
Rozeboom no remedy for the breach. 133
One interesting line of unsophisticated merchant cases imposes a duty to
disclose hard terms to commercial parties who are disadvantaged in the bar-
gaining process. The first case to articulate this duty was Weaver v. Ameri-
can Oil Co.,' 34 a case in which a complicated form contract containing a
hold-harmless clause was held unconscionable because it was presented
127. 373 N.W.2d 30 (S.D. 1985).
128. Some conflict about whether farmers are merchants exists among cases. Compare
Gray v. Kirkland, 550 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (farmer selling his own crops is a merchant) with Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark.
962, 395 S.W.2d 555, 556-57 (1965) (farmer selling his own crops is not a merchant). If the
UCC standard in comment I to § 2-104 of a "professional in business" rather than a "casual
seller" is used, a farmer who regularly sells his own crops or farm products would seem to be a
merchant for purposes of evaluating the unconscionability of his contracts. See 1 R. ANDER-
SON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104:37 (3d ed. 1981). A review-
ing court, however, must consider all the facts that relate to a particular party's bargaining
capability and choice, and must not reason by classification.
129. 373 N.W.2d at 35.
130. 358 N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1984).
131. Courts have decided almost all of the cases in favor of the telephone companies. For
an exhaustive list of cases see the authorities cited in Rozeboom, 358 N.W.2d at 247-48. Con-
tra Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969); Discount
Fabric House, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., Ill Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d 417 (1984); cf. Albu-
querque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 102 N.M. 445, 697 P.2d 128 (1985)
(analyzing contract as a contract of adhesion, but affirming summary judgment against cus-
tomer because customer did not prove inability to negotiate for removal of offending clause).
132. 358 N.W.2d at 245.
133. Id. at 245-46. Contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are not necessarily
unconscionable. Courts will not hold a commercially reasonable term, that is justified by some
legitimate need of a party, unconscionable even if bargaining on that point was not possible.
See Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522, 198 N.W.2d 57, 61 (1972).
134. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
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without explanation to a high school dropout who depended on the continu-
ation of the business relationship for his living. 135 More recently, Johnson v.
Mobil Oil Corp. ,136 a case in which the complaining party was illiterate, ex-
pressed the idea that a person seeking to enforce a harsh contract term
against an "uncounseled layman" must take affirmative steps to explain the
term. 137 Despite the fact that Mobil did not know of Johnson's illiteracy at
the time of contracting, and Johnson alleged no unfair bargaining tactics, the
court held that a consequential damages exclusion in the contract was un-
conscionable because Mobil had not obtained Johnson's voluntary, knowing
consent. 138
Three recent cases have extended this duty to disclose to commercial par-
ties who are not inherently disadvantaged in their bargaining capability, but
who are what Professor Melvin Eisenberg might call "transactionally inca-
pacitated." 1 39 Transactionally incapacitated means that the party has suffi-
cient education, sophistication, and experience to represent himself in
ordinary transactions, but not in the particular transaction in question. I
All three of these cases involved farmers. In Martin v. Joseph Harris Co. 141
the plaintiffs were commercial farmers who challenged a disclaimer of war-
ranties in their purchase of cabbage seed. The plaintiff in A & M Produce
Co. v. FMC Corp. 142 was a farming company owned by a lifelong farmer who
had no previous experience growing tomatoes commercially. In A & M Pro-
duce the plaintiff challenged the disclaimer of warranty and disclaimer of
consequential damages contained in a form contract for the purchase of to-
mato-growing equipment from the defendant. In both cases the courts em-
phasized the disparity in the buyers' and sellers' economic strengths, the
buyers' lack of experience and choice in the transactions, the harshness of
the offending terms, and the inclusion of the offending provisions in form
contracts. 143 Both courts concluded that the sellers had the obligation to
show that the buyers had knowledge of the term. 144
The third case presented some significant differences. In Langemeier v.
135. 276 N.E.2d at 148.
136. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
137. Id. at 269.
138. Id. In contracts that are basically nonnegotiable, the value of disclosure of terms is
questionable. If Mobil had read and explained the contract to Johnson, but refused to make
changes in the form, would the contract be enforceable, or merely unconscionable on a differ-
ent ground?
139. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 763-73.
140. Id.
141. 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985).
142. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982). See generally Note, Unconscionabil-
ity Redefined, supra note 3 (analyzes A & M).
143. Martin, 767 F.2d at 300-31; A & M, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-
26.
144. Martin, 767 F.2d at 301; A & M, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-26;
cf. Mallory v. Conida Warehouses, Inc., 134 Mich. App. 28, 350 N.W.2d 825 (1984) (growers
buying light red kidney beans were experienced in buying, but not with legal terms of law of
warranty; disclaimer and limitation of remedy ineffective because not conspicuous; trial court's
finding of unconscionability not clearly erroneous).
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National Oats Co. 145 an agronomist and agricultural financier who was a
novice at growing popcorn entered into a contract to buy popcorn seed from
and sell the popcorn to National Oats. Included in the contract was a clause
that permitted National Oats to reject popcorn that contained defects, in-
cluding damage due to freezing weather. National Oats represented to
Langemeier that the popcorn would reach maturity in ninety-nine days. Na-
tional Oats, however, did not volunteer the information that the popcorn
needed an additional twenty days beyond maturity to field-dry. With Na-
tional Oats's approval, Langemeier planted the crop in late May. Freezing
weather in September and October badly damaged the crop. National Oats
rejected the crop, and Langemeier sued for damages.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling
that the contract was unconscionable because National Oats' defective dis-
closure concerning the growing time unfairly distorted the bargaining trans-
action.' 46 This case represents a significant expansion of the Weaver-
Johnson duty to disclose, because it imposes a duty on a contracting party to
disclose not only the terms contained in the contract, but also facts about the
nature of the complaining party's business venture that one would expect the
complaining party to know. 147
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING UNCONSCIONABILITY
CLAIMS IN CONTRACTS BETWEEN MERCHANTS
A. Consideration of Policies
A good starting point for formulating a sensible approach to unconsciona-
bility problems occurring between merchants is an examination of the coun-
tervailing policies that exist in these cases. The enforcement of private
bargains is normally in the public interest. Reliable enforcement of private
agreements is important to the smooth functioning of the economy because
it permits people to plan effectively for the future and encourages them to
extend credit to others.148 Enforcement also facilitates the peace-keeping
function of the law by discouraging people from resorting to violent self-help
to remedy the breach of a contract.' 49 Any contract avoidance device, be it
traditional or modern, creates some dissonance with these policies. Never-
theless, courts will refuse to enforce private agreements in some instances.
Courts refuse enforcement of private agreements either because the way in
which the agreement was reached casts serious doubt on the existence of
145. 775 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1985).
146. Id. at 976.
147. The case contained no allegation that National Oats knew that Langemeier was igno-
rant of the 20-day drying down period. The person Langemeier hired to farm the popcorn was
experienced in growing popcorn. In addition, evidence showed that, based on a 50-year aver-
age, Langemeier's planting date was early enough to permit the crop to grow and mature
before harvest except for the unanticipated bad weather. Id. at 978 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
148. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 744-46; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 5.1, at
325.
149. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 744.
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voluntary consent or because the contracting process or the contract itself
violates other important social commitments.
In the case of unconscionability, both substantive and administrative rea-
sons justify interference with private contracts. The substantive justification
for interference is to ensure that contracts are the products of mutual con-
sent rather than of subtle and varied forms of unfairness made possible by
widespread form contracting and disparity of bargaining power. The admin-
istrative justification is that permitting courts to evaluate the fairness of con-
tracts directly discourages them from twisting other doctrines to avoid
unfairness. 150
In merchant-to-merchant transactions the importance of reliable enforce-
ment of contracts, or certainty, and predictability of contract law are height-
ened. 5 ' Merchant-to-merchant contracts are likely to have economic
implications for others besides the parties to the contracts. Employees, cus-
tomers further down the distributional chain, consumers, and shareholders,
for example, could all suffer indirect harm from an unremedied breach of
contract. Contracts between merchants are likely to involve more money
than typical consumer transactions, so that contracts breached in such a
context are more likely to result in litigation, implicating judicial resources.
The fairness rationales underlying the doctrine of unconscionability, how-
ever, apply with equal force to at least some, if not all, merchant-to-
merchant transactions. A principled application of uneonscionability must
strike a balance between the need for fairness and the need for certainty.
B. Standards for Applying Unconscionability to Merchants
The problem with applying unconscionability in merchant-to-merchant
transactions is the belief that the optimistic assumptions of classical contract
law are accurate in contracts between merchants: that in the merchant-to-
merchant contract experienced, knowledgeable parties deal on an equal ba-
sis, with each party having the ability to codetermine contract terms and to
shop around for more suitable deals. If all merchant-to-merchant transac-
tions really fitted this model, the policies that support certainty and predict-
ability would be overwhelming. The application of unconscionability would
strike at the heart of freedom of contract in an unprincipled perversion of
the purposes of the doctrine. As one court put it, unconscionability was not
designed to "relieve an experienced merchant of the misfortune occasioned
by his own poor business practices."15 2
Not to be overlooked, however, is that business experience and knowledge
varies as much among merchants as among consumers. Certainly the alarm-
ing rate at which small businesses fail rebuts the presumption that all busi-
150. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
151. Murray, supra note 21, at 778-79; see A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.
App. 3d 473, 486-87, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (1982).




nesspeople are knowledgeable, competent, and experienced.1 53 In addition,
while form contracting may not be as nearly universal among merchants as
it is in consumer transactions, it is still prevalent in the business world.
Form contracts can create the very same assent and choice problems among
merchants as they create among consumers. To expect that all business peo-
ple read form contracts any more frequently or understand them any better
than consumers do is unrealistic.1 54 Equally unrealistic is to expect that a
businessperson will be represented by counsel on every contract he signs.
Unconscionability should, then, be available to some merchants in some bar-
gaining situations.
A review of the case law indicates that courts are aware that unconsciona-
bility should not be used to shield a capable party who has made a conscious
gamble from risks he assumed.1 55 In cases in which capable parties have
actually bargained or had the opportunity to bargain, courts should not in-
tervene. One caveat, however, is that courts should use care in characteriz-
ing a party as capable of representing his interests in a bargaining situation.
Courts should not presume that all commercial parties possess this ability.
In cases involving capable commercial parties the unfair surprise form of
unconscionablility should not be recognized. The policy that favors cer-
tainty in contracts between merchants should justify the imposition of the
duty to read on commercially sophisticated parties. A determination of
whether a party is capable should be based on facts such as the complaining
party's education, opportunity for representation by counsel, familiarity and
prior experience with the type of transaction at hand, and commercial
experience.
In cases involving capable parties presented with nonnegotiable contracts,
however, a finding of unconscionability in the form of oppression should be
at least a possibility. The law cannot reasonably presume that every term, or
even every contract, will be negotiable. If every contract had to be negotia-
ble, business enterprises would lose the benefits that form contracts pro-
vide.156 Nonbargaining has significance only insofar as it permits a party to
gain an unfair, that is, commercially unreasonable, end.
The fact that a contract, or a term in a contract, is nonnegotiable should
not normally militate for a finding of unconscionability. A commercial
party who has been offered some opportunity, as opposed to a necessity, on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis presumably calculates that accepting the offer on the
offeror's terms is more advantageous than foregoing the deal. Thus, the ac-
cepting party has some degree of choice. A different situation exists, how-
ever, when a party is in distress or is dealing with a monopoly or oligopoly
regarding some goods or service that it must have.157 Even then, a finding of
153. See Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts, supra note 20, at 458.
154. See Murray, supra note 21, at 778.
155. See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
157. For discussion of distress as a circumstance under which the normal bargain theory is
not justified see Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 754-63.
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oppression depends on the court's determination that the clause or contract
in question was not justified by the risks undertaken by the drafting party.
Courts should apply a somewhat looser standard to commercial parties
who are demonstrably disadvantaged in their bargaining capability and who
are given little practical ability to codetermine terms. Courts should look for
facts that would indicate that the complaining party was a "sheep keeping
company with wolves."' 58 Facts such as lack of education, lack of business
experience, lack of contracting experience in transactions of similar magni-
tude, and dependancy on the drafting party would be relevant to show that a
party was unsophisticated. In this group of cases assumptions about a com-
mercial party's ability to understand and negotiate for terms fall apart. Un-
fair surprise should be as much a possibility for an unsophisticated
commercial party as it is for a consumer. The unsophisticated commercial
party is likely to be an uncounseled layman who probably has no greater
experience with the transaction at hand than does a typical consumer, but
who is usually playing for much higher stakes.
One of the most difficult questions surrounding unconscionability is
whether superconscionability will insulate a contract from judicial interfer-
ence. If a drafting party takes affirmative steps to explain a contract verbally
and the complaining party evidences understanding and consent, can a
clause in the contract be unconscionable? The answer depends on whether
unconscionability is only about notifying the complaining party of "the sad
state of his rights... at the outset." 159 Courts apparently want to be able to
evaluate the fairness of a bargain apart from questions of consent. 160 Thus,
permitting the courts to do so would prevent the distortion of other doc-
trines. Furthermore, a term may logically be unconscionable because of op-
pression or gross substantive unfairness even though the complaining party
has been fully informed of the terms of the contract. Superconscionability,
therefore, should insulate the contract only from a finding of unconscionabil-
ity of the unfair surprise variety.1 61
C. Increasing the Predictability of Unconscionability Decisions
Given the importance of predictability in commercial transactions, courts
must do what they can to clarify the grounds for the decisions they reach in
unconscionability cases between merchants. Unconscionability is not a
highly predictable doctrine even with the fullest exposition of the facts of a
case. A review of the merchant cases indicates that courts are less likely to
explain themselves in merchant unconscionability cases than in consumer
cases. When courts fail to provide relevant details that bear on the parties'
capabilities and the type of bargaining that occurred in the contract, how-
ever, the precedential value of a case is difficult to evaluate. In a case be-
tween two large companies that had negotiated extensively for a contract, for
158. K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 308, 263 A.2d 390, 393 (1970).
159. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 4-7, at 165-66.
160. See Spanogle, supra note 2, at 954-55.
161. See Murray, supra note 21, at 777.
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example, a court's exposition of the relevant facts and its explanation that it
rejected a claim of unconscionability because the parties were sophisticated
businesspeople who actually negotiated for the contract would promote pre-
dictability. Bare citations of the presumption that unconscionability will not
apply in commercial settings or of other cases previously upholding similar
clauses are not very informative. 162
Courts would also further predictability by analyzing a case according to
the doctrine that performs the desired policing function, but that yields the
most predictable results. 163 If a case can be analyzed under common law
doctrines of offer and acceptance, for example, the court's treatment of the
case as an offer and acceptance problem is preferable to treatment of the case
as an unconscionability problem. 164
IV. CONCLUSION
Although consumers have been the primary beneficiaries of the doctrine of
unconscionability, the case law reveals an increasing tendency to recognize
that commercial parties can be victimized by the same types of bargaining
unfairness that stimulated the rebirth and expansion of unconscionability.
Indeed, the authors of a major treatise on commercial law comment that
most of the recent developments of interest in the law of unconscionability
have centered around commercial parties. 165 The danger is that courts will
withhold the doctrine from deserving commercial parties or apply the doc-
trine in an unprincipled way to relieve capable merchants from the hard
effects of contracts for which they bargained. A principled application of
unconscionability must differentiate between the situation in which capable
parties bargain for a term and the situation in which an unfair term is im-
posed on an unsophisticated commercial party.
162. Compare Communications Maintenance, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1209-
10 (7th Cir. 1985) (only stated that district court upheld termination clause and cited a prior
7th Cir. case upholding termination clause) with Gelderman & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc.,
527 F.2d 571, 575-76 (8th Cir. 1975) (full exposition of facts concerning bargaining capability
and bargaining process).
163. For an argument that courts can and should use common law formation, policing, and
disclosure devices to resolve most of the cases of procedural abuse that are today addressed
under the rubric of unconscionability see Hillman, supra note 8, at 19-23.
164. Id. The court in Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'l, 373 N.W.2d 30 (S.D. 1985), for exam-
ple, could have resolved the case without resort to unconscionability by using common law
formation doctrines.
165. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 4-2, at 149-50.
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